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INTRODUCTION
Rethinking Climate Change, Conflict
and Security
JAN SELBY
Department of International Relations, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
CLEMENS HOFFMANN
Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
This special issue of Geopolitics presents a series of critical
interventions on the links between global anthropogenic climate
change, conflict and security. In this introduction, we situate the
special issue by providing an assessment of the state of debate on
climate security, and then by summarising the eight articles that
follow. We observe, to start with, that contemporary climate secu-
rity discourse is dominated by a problematic ensemble of policy-led
framings and assumptions. And we submit that the contributions to
this issue help rethink this dominant discourse in two distinct ways,
offering both a series of powerful critiques, plus new interpreta-
tions of climate-conflict linkages which extend beyond Malthusian
orthodoxy.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY: THE STATE OF DEBATE
Held amidst the neo-classical splendour of London’s Lancaster House, the
UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s 2012 conference on climate and
resource security brought together a couple of hundred diplomats, politi-
cians, military officials, and corporate and NGO representatives to push
forward the ‘international debate’ on climate security. The conference was
opened by Ed Davey, UK Secretary of State for Climate Change and Energy,
who characterised global climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’ that would
Address correspondence to Jan Selby, Department of International Relations, University
of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QN, UK. E-mail: j.selby@sussex.ac.uk
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748 Jan Selby and Clemens Hoffmann
magnify existing resource pressures, especially in ‘fragile’ states ‘already
under threat’, and concluded that ‘we need to be ready for a world where
climate instability drives political instability’.1 Thereupon followed a series
of gloom-ridden pronouncements – from President Ali Bongo Ondimba of
Gabon’s assertion that climate change in Africa ‘will cause armed conflicts in
23 countries and political unrest in another 13’ (by what exact date wasn’t
clear); to the claim that there are currently 350,000 climate-related deaths per
year worldwide, rising to 1 million per year by 2030 if no action is taken.2
When one of the just two academics in attendance – who happened to be
one of the present authors – had the temerity to comment from the floor that
there was no scientific consensus on the conflict and security implications
of climate change, the response was immediate and striking. One speaker
dismissed this point as evidence of academic ‘hubris’. Another dismissed it
on the grounds that consensus is lacking on all manner of issues (which is of
course true – but that hadn’t stopped him or other participants from speaking
as if there did exist a consensus on this particular subject). And still another
asserted that the links between climate change and conflict were obvious,
since 80% of conflicts happen in arid zones. Something close to a diplomatic
norm had been violated.
We begin with this vignette because it nicely captures several key fea-
tures of contemporary discourse on anthropogenic climate change, conflict
and security. It illustrates, first, just how entrenched certain assumptions and
narratives about climate security are, right across Western governments, mil-
itaries and civil society – as well as, if to a lesser degree, in academia.
Most of this discourse is resolutely Malthusian, in both substance and tone.
Thus on the one hand its overall tone is deeply pessimistic, foreseeing a
future in which, to give but a brief selection of examples, there is large-scale
environmental migration ‘potentially involving hundreds of millions’ or even
‘perhaps billions of people’3; in which climate change will ‘probably’ be ‘the
biggest trigger of genocide in the twenty-first century’4; in which, by 2030,
an additional 393,000 African lives may be being lost each year through
warming-induced conflict5; and in which, by 2037, there may be widespread
social ‘collapse’, including of such things as ‘the northern tier of African
countries’, ‘liberal concepts of openness’, ‘multilateral institutions’, ‘finan-
cial and production systems’, ‘health care systems’, and more besides.6 Such
dystopian scenarios aside, most climate security discourse is also indebted
to the Malthusian tradition for its core ontological and political premises.
Its overwhelmingly environmentally determinist world-view ascribes causal
primacy to environmental resources – and especially to presumed resource
scarcities – in generating societal stress, breakdown and conflict. Moreover,
just as Malthus identified the poor as the main social agents of resource cri-
sis, so contemporary climate security discourse tends to interpret the global
poor, and Sub-Saharan Africans in particular, as the most likely subjects –
and also sources – of climate-related conflict. As a corollary, climate security
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Introduction 749
thinking tends to provide only the thinnest analysis of political and political-
economic structures and processes, including of the power and strategies of
local elites and states, and of the international and global contexts in which
these are embedded. Its primary concern with the conflict impacts of climatic
changes – increased temperatures, shifting rainfall patterns, and so on – also
results in a striking neglect of the possibility that climate change mitigation
and adaptation measures might contribute (or may already be contributing)
to conflict. In sum, most of this discourse is highly climate-centric, ‘reducing
the future to climate’ and failing to adequately contextualise climate impacts
in relation to broader processes of global and social change, even when it is
acknowledged that these climate impacts will only ever occur in intersection
with other threats and factors.7
The ‘international debate’ on climate security is also – as the Lancaster
House conference made abundantly clear – led mostly by policy, military and
NGO actors, not scientists. In this, the climate security field diverges sharply
from other areas of climate change policy, where scientists have played for-
mative, if far from straightforward, roles in pushing forward national and
international action.8 Moreover, in this it also differs from the initial ‘environ-
ment security’ debates of the 1990s, in which natural and political scientists –
most famously Thomas Homer-Dixon and colleagues – played crucial roles,
alongside journalists and policymakers, in redefining the environment as
a key post–Cold War national security challenge.9 By contrast with these
areas, in the genealogy of climate security it is defence policy planners and
their scenario reports which have been at the helm. Thus the first major cli-
mate security study, commissioned by the Pentagon’s leading futurologist,
contained very little evidence but nonetheless envisaged large-scale military
confrontations over natural resources, a ‘flood of refugees’ arriving in the US
from the Caribbean (by 2012!), and civil war in China plus the ‘near collapse’
of the EU (by 2025).10 Likewise, the single most influential report on the
subject, a 2007 study authored by a dozen retired three- and four-star US
generals and admirals, concluded that climate change will act as a ‘threat
multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world’
– though, once again, with only the thinnest of evidence bases.11 These
and other early reports were primarily exercises in securitisation, oriented
to pushing climate change up national security – and also diplomatic and
development – agendas. Only in their wake has a significant body of actual
research been produced on the subject. Any discourse always has multiple
origins, of course, but climate security discourse has clearly been led and
shaped more by policy actors than by scientific evidence.
This is not at all to suggest that climate security discourse is unchang-
ing, or has remained uncontested. The quality of academic debate on
climate security has certainly improved. Dozens of quantitative studies of
climate-conflict linkages have now been published, with some finding clear
evidence of linkages, and others reaching contrary conclusions.12 A number
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of excellent critiques of climate security thinking and its ‘securitisation’ of
climate change have been produced.13 Moreover, a fair number of anal-
yses now stray from the Malthusian narrative outlined above, to include
discussions of such themes as the conflict potential of geo-engineering and
bio-fuels production,14 the potential for urban climate-related conflict,15 the
impacts of violence in aggravating climate change vulnerabilities,16 and the
possibility of climate change promoting peace-building.17 Reflecting this,
the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assess-
ment report’s treatment of conflict and security issues constitutes a marked
improvement on its earlier iterations. For while these earlier reports were evi-
dentially slight, relentlessly Malthusian in their emphases, and also unrepre-
sentative of the then state of knowledge on environment-security linkages,18
the Fifth Assessment Report’s (AR5’s) treatment of conflict and security issues
is arguably none of these things – instead referencing over 100 studies, and
reviewing not only the Malthusian literatures on climate-induced ‘collapse’
and drought-conflict linkages in Africa, but also critiques of Malthusian think-
ing (especially representations of the 2003-2005 Darfur conflict as a ‘climate
war’) plus several of the non-Malthusian themes noted above.19
Nonetheless, problems remain. Whatever the merits of AR5’s detailed
review of the climate security literature, its summary reverts to standard
Malthusian tropes: ‘livelihoods, culture, migration and conflict’ are presented
as the ‘key elements’ of the climate security problematique, with climate
change portrayed as effecting a ‘deterioration of livelihoods’, and this in turn
sparking migration, changes in cultural practices and – in the absence of
functioning institutions – an increased risk of conflict.20 Moreover, public and
policy discourse on climate security has barely changed. Like Ed Davey and
many before him, the Pentagon now follows the Center for Naval Analysis
(CNA) in characterising climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’ – one that
will ‘aggravate stressors abroad such as poverty, environmental degradation,
political instability, and social tensions – conditions that can enable terrorist
activity and other forms of violence’.21 Meanwhile, in its most recent report
on the subject, the CNA claims that climate change impacts are ‘already accel-
erating instability in vulnerable areas of the world and serving as catalysts for
conflict’ – despite offering barely a shred of supporting evidence.22 Climate
security discourse is not nearly as monolithic as it once was, but further
critical interrogation is still required.
THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS SPECIAL ISSUE
This special issue presents a series of just such critical interrogations. Based
on papers initially presented at the Rethinking Climate Change, Conflict and
Security conference held at the University of Sussex, UK, in 2012,23 plus
other invited contributions, it is the first collection of its sort dedicated to
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Introduction 751
problematising and going beyond contemporary climate security orthodox-
ies. For while some excellent critiques of climate security discourse have
been produced in recent years, as noted above, none of these has been
published within any of the high-profile special issues on the subject –
with the latter instead presenting quite mainstream, Malthusian and Africa-
centred analyses, even when they have sometimes concluded that ‘there
is not yet much evidence for climate change as an important driver of
conflict’.24 By contrast, the articles that follow all diverge from orthodox
Malthusian accounts of climate security. Instead, their common thread lies
in their emphasis on the centrality of the political within the climate-conflict
problematique, and in their arguments – whether explicitly made or not –
for a re-politicisation of climate security discourse.
The first four articles are essentially critiques of particular aspects of
this mainstream thinking. To start with, the articles by Betsy Hartmann
and Harry Verhoeven present complementary interrogations of climate secu-
rity discourse as it pertains to the region most frequently associated with
climate-driven chaos: Sub-Saharan Africa. Common to their approaches is
an insistence on the importance of historicising contemporary climate secu-
rity narratives – with Hartmann demonstrating how these are rooted in the
conservative philosophy of Thomas Malthus, as well as in colonial ecology;
and Verhoeven emphasising that representations of the African environment,
whether of ‘gardens of Eden’ or ‘hearts of darkness’, have long been cen-
tral to colonial and imperial imaginaries. By extension, both Hartmann and
Verhoeven also argue that, like its various Malthusian predecessors, con-
temporary climate security discourse says more about Northern stereotypes,
parables and fears than it does about Africa per se; and that this discourse
has powerful political effects, constituting part of what Hartmann refers to as
a new ‘anticipatory regime for Africa’ that functions as an ideal accomplice to
local political restructuring as well as international intervention. Verhoeven
specifically emphasises the central supporting roles played by African elites
in climate and environmental security discourse, while Hartmann stresses
its highly gendered character, especially in its convergence with interna-
tional population initiatives. Together, these two articles raise key themes
that recur throughout this special issue: climate security discourse’s simplis-
tic misreadings of human-environment relations; its historical debt to colonial
and racialised narratives; its imbrication with power; its troubling political
effects; and, not least, the need for forms of analyses that help to historicise
and re-politicise our understanding of the conflict and security implications
of climate change.
The next two articles offer more specific critiques, with Michael Mason
exploring climate security discourse within a particular policy arena, and
Jan Selby providing a methodology critique of large-N studies on climate
change and conflict. Mason critiques human security readings of the cli-
mate security problematique – i.e., formulations which treat populations
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and individuals rather than the state as the referent objects of security – by
analysing their deployment within United Nations vulnerability assessments
in conflict and post-conflict areas. Focusing especially on the work of the UN
Development Programme, the UN Environment Programme and the Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, he argues that these agencies’
climate vulnerability assessments apply a technical-managerial logic which
leads them to downplay the effects of organised violence in producing
environment-related insecurities, to obscure responsibility for conflict-related
harms, and to promote depoliticised climate adaptation policies. Though not
explicitly articulated in these terms, Mason’s biopolitical analysis illustrates
that the securitisation of climate change is not only problematic when done
in the name of national security: human securitisations of climate change can
have no less questionable effects.
By contrast with Mason’s primarily policy-oriented focus, Selby’s contri-
bution critiques the dominant ‘scientific’ approach to understanding climate
security, namely large-N quantitative studies of the relations between cli-
matic and conflict variables. Exploring both their specific coding and causal
practices, and their underlying epistemological premises, Selby argues that
the correlations identified within these studies are spurious; that even if they
were meaningful they would not provide a solid foundation for advanc-
ing predictions about the conflict impacts of climate change; and that, for
all their pretensions to value-free scientific analysis, they reflect and repro-
duce the sort of conservative readings of future climate chaos identified by
Hartmann and Verhoeven. Selby thus calls for a departure from positivist-
quantitative climate conflict research and, paralleling arguments made in
the three preceding papers, for a re-politicisation of academic discourse on
climate security.
In the middle of the special issue, Franziskus von Lucke, Zehra
Wellmann and Thomas Diez present not so much a critique, as a new
typology and out of that a set of normative questions for approaching
the securitisation of climate change. Distinguishing between ‘territorial’-,
‘individual’- and ‘planetary’-level securitisations, and between processes of
‘securitisation’ and ‘riskification’ – the former involving the discursive con-
struction of existential threats that legitimate extraordinary measures, the
latter diffuse and uncertain challenges which are instead linked to precau-
tionary management – von Lucke et al. identify six distinct ways in which
climate change has recently been securitised, and on this basis pose a series
of questions about the political dangers associated with these different types.
Though their answers to these questions are cautiously stated, von Lucke
et al.’s premise is that the representation of climate change as a security
problem is not a neutral or technical act, but a normative one that thus
demands the exercise of ethico-political judgement.
The final three papers present new interpretations of actual and poten-
tial climate-conflict linkages which extend beyond Malthusian orthodoxy.
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Introduction 753
Ayesha Siddiqi, first, offers a contextualised qualitative analysis of the impacts
of a climatic disaster – the large-scale flooding that affected southern Pakistan
in 2010–2011 – on local political militancy. Challenging the dominant narra-
tive of Islamist militant groups mobilising and extending their power base
on the back of this flooding, especially through rescue and relief activi-
ties, Siddiqi instead finds the political impacts of the floods to have been
contradictory, uneven and context-dependent. In particular, she emphasises
that both human agency and pre-existing political structures and dynam-
ics – whether local patterns of social exclusion, or tacit alliances between
local power brokers, state officials and militants – were decisive in shap-
ing patterns of post-disaster Islamist mobilisation. By implication, Siddiqi’s
contribution highlights the centrality of political structures and action in
determining whether and how climatic shocks and changes may – or may
not – feed into patterns of conflict.
Janani Vivekananda, Janpeter Schilling and Dan Smith also explore
community-level dynamics, in their case within three districts of post-conflict
Nepal. By contrast with Malthusian studies, which emphasise the impacts of
human-environment relations on conflict, Vivekananda et al. do the reverse,
analysing the impacts of Nepal’s protracted civil war and post-conflict insta-
bility on local vulnerability, adaptation and resilience to climate change. They
find that local resilience across their three districts is principally constrained
by ‘bad governance and weak institutions’, stemming mainly from Nepal’s
legacy of conflict, though also from conflicts over international aid, includ-
ing climate change adaptation funding. Notwithstanding this, they argue that
large-scale international aid, adaptation funding included, is vital to post-
conflict countries such as Nepal – and insist that the challenge is to develop
‘holistic’ approaches to resilience-building that are as sensitive to political
and governance as to environmental factors. For all the differences between
them, Vivekananda et al. thus share with Mason a common concern at
the ‘anti-political’ character of contemporary climate change development
interventions.
The final article, by Alexander Dunlap and James Fairhead, also explores
adaptation-related conflicts, but in this case in relation to global political
and political economic processes. Dunlap and Fairhead argue that interna-
tional climate change adaptation and mitigation policies, and other associated
global environmental policies, are already driving the creation of new com-
modities and markets for carbon, biofuels, biodiversity and food, and in
turn are contributing worldwide to conflict-ridden transformations in access
to land, forests and water. Using diverse examples, they demonstrate how
the commodification and marketisation of nature has long been a violent,
militarised process, and how recent extensions of this – through climate
change-related conservation, offsetting and land acquisition programmes –
are themselves fomenting conflict. And they contend that the problem with
mainstream climate security discourse is not just that it generally ignores
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these already-existing processes in favour of speculation about future threats,
but that its securitisations are actively contributing to marketisation and
militarisation in the global periphery.
Taken together, the contributions to this special issue highlight the
inadequacy of Malthusian climate security thinking. They do this not by dis-
counting the possibility of climate-related conflicts, but by emphasising that
conflict is shaped principally by political forces – which are at once global
and local, material and discursive, structured and agential – and which can-
not be ‘reduced to climate’.25 As several of our contributors emphasise, the
securitisation of warming, droughts and floods is not only evidentially weak
and unwarranted. It may also give succour to regressive political forces, or
may become self-fulfilling, with discursive securitisation feeding and legit-
imating militarised policy responses. And it may end up doing very little
– and may even obstruct or distract attention from – the huge challenge
of decarbonising contemporary global society and actually stemming global
anthropogenic climate change. It is hoped that the present articles make
some contribution, however small, to forestalling these possibilities.
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